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NOTES
CONTRACTS-PERFORMANCE---EFFECT OF ACT OF GOD. The unpreced-
ented floods which swept through North Dakota's Red River Valley in
the spring of 19501 have aroused some speculation as to the effect of
North Dakota statutes on contract liability, particularly in regard to
leases. The North Dakota Code' states:
'The want of performance of an obligation or of an offer of per-
formance, in whole or in part, or any delay therein is excused by
the following causes to the extent they operate.
2. When it is prevented or delayed by an irresistible superhuman
cause...unless the parties have agreed expressly to the con-
trary."
The Code also limits the liability of a carrier because of any ir-
resistible superhuman cause.'
Other states have statutes with similar provisions' excusing per-
formance in the event of an irresistible superhuman cause, commonly
called Act of God.
ORIGIN OF ACT OF GOD DOCTRINE
Probably the earliest use of the term, Act of God, was made by
Coke in Shelly's Case,' and was continued enthusiastically by him in
subsequent cases.' The doctrine arose to soften the harsh rule first
expounded in the leading case of Paradine v. Jane.' In that case
Prince Rupert had entered with hostile forces and expelled the ten-
ant from the land, preventing him from taking his profits and thus
making him delinquent in his rent payments. The court stated the
law of the time when it said, "When the party by his own contract
created a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good,
notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he
might have provided against it by his contract .... Though the land
be surrounded or gained by the sea, or made barren by wildfire, yet
the lessor shall have his whole rent." This rule was directly applied
in numerous English cases' and was adopted in many American
L Grand Forks Herald, April 25, 1950.
1 N. D. Rev. Code § 9-1104 (1943).
1 N. D. ktev. Code § 8-0901 (1943).
4 Mont. Rev. Code §§ 7452, 7867 (1935); Cal. Civ. Code § 1511 (Di.ering 1941).
Wolfe v. Shelly, 1 Co. Rep. 93b, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (C. B. 1581).
Keighley's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 1392, 77 Eng. Rep. 1136 (C. B. 1609); Blum-
field's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 86b, 77 Eng. Rep. 185 (K. B. 1596); Laughter's Case, 5
Co. Rep. 21b, 77 Eng. Rep. 82 (K. B. 1595).
1 Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K. B. 1648).
s Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnaise, 12 Q. B. D. 589 (1884); Sheffield Waterworks
Co. v. Carter, 8 Q. B. D. 632 (1882); Atkinson v. Ritchie, 10 East 531, 103
Eng. Rep. 877 (K. B. 1809).
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cases.' Although at times harsh and unjust, the rule has its, founda-
tion in good sense and inflexible honesty. The law will not insert
for the benefit of one of the parties, by construction, an exception
which the parties have not, either by design or neglect, inserted in
their engagement.'0
Although the rule of Paradine v. Jane represents an ideal state-
ment of the law of contract performance, and is frequently stated
by the courts to be the general rule of contracts," it soon became
apparent that injustice and hardship would result if it were strictly
enforced. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Anglo-
American Law recognized several exceptions under which a promisor
might be excused from performance when certain supervening
elements made performance impossible."
THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE EXCEPTION TO PERFORMANCE
If A contracts to sell and deliver his black cow Daisy to B and
Daisy dies, how, can A perform his contract? Obviously such a con-
tract is based upon the continued good health and activity of Daisy.
This illustrates an exception which was recognized in an early Eng-
lish case" where the court said, "In contracts in which the per-
formance depends on the continued existence of a given person or
thing, a condition is implied in the contract that the impossibility
of performance arising from the perishing of the person or thing
shall excuse the performance."" The continued existence exception
has tbecome firmly intrenched in American decisions" and is ap-
proved by the leading authorities." It has been applied in situations
involving renting a particular premise," death of a prospective
partner,' death of a particular animal," failure of natural gas sup-
" Berg v. Erickson, 234 Fed. 817 (8th. Cir. 1916); School Dist. No. 1 v.
Dauchy, 25 Conn. 530 (1857); School Trustees of Trenton v. Bennett, 27 N. J. L.
513 (1859); see Southern Ry. v. White, 284 Fed. 560, 561 (6th Cir. 1922).
" School Trustees of Trenton v. Bennett, 27 N. J. L. 513 (1859).
" Colson, The Excuse of Impossibility in West Virginia Contract Law, 48 W. Va.
L. Q. 189, 194 (1942).
" Page, Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 Mich.
L. Rev. 589, 600 (1920).
1 Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q. B. 1863). Plain-
tiffs leased Surrey Gardens and Music Hall from defendants. The premises were
destroyed by fire, and plaintiffs sued for breach of the lease agreement. Action was
denied on the ground that the parties impliedly contracted on the basis that the
premises would remain in existence.
14 Id. at 309.
W North American Oil Co. v. Globe Pipe Line Co., 6 F. 2d 564 (8th Cir. 1925);
Barkemeyer Grain Co. v. Hannant, 66 Mont. 120, 213 Pac. 208 (1923); Pearce-Young-
Angel Co. v. Charles R. Allen, Inc., 213 S. C. 578, 50 S. E. 2d 698 (1948). But see
Berg v. Erickson, 234 Fed. 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1916). See Note, 74 A. L. R. 1289
(1931).
'5 Restatement, Contracts I § 281, 460 (1932); 6 Williston, Contracts § 1946
(rev. ed. 1938).
1? Taylor v. Caldwell, 8 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q. B. 1863).
" Dow v. State Bank, 88 Minn. 355, 93 N. W. 121 (1903).
19 Pinkham v. Libbey, 93 Me. 575, 45 Atl. 823 (1900).
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ply,' trees from a certain tract," fruit from a designated or-
chard," and potatoes from a certain field.'
FRUSTRATION OF THE VENTURE EXCEPTION TO PERFORMANCE
Closely related to the continued existence exception is the frus-
tration of the venture exception which is best illustrated by the
"coronation cases." These held that the postponement of the corona-
tion of Edward VII excused performance of contracts for hire of
seats and vantage points along the anticipated route of procession."
Performance was excused, not because impossible, but because
circumstances beyond the parties' control had frustrated the sole
value of the contracts. Whether this should be based on failure of
consideration, or implied condition, or destruction of the subject
matter, the end result seems equitable in most instances."
Also illustrative of this exception are the many cases of com-
mercial ventures frustrated by government controls, regulations,
and rationing."
THE IMPRACTICABILITY ExCEPTION To PERFORMANCE
The promisor's obligation continues, even though performance of
a contract becomes difficult, more burdensome, or more expensive;
nor will the fact that the "promisor is unable to perform excuse him
from liability." This rule is based upon the fact that the ultimate
purpose of a contract is to transfer the risk of performance to the
promisor; this purpose is defeated if performance is excused merely
because the promisor finds that he has assumed a greater oblightion
than he can profitably discharge. Applications of this rule are num-
erous." However there persists a vigorous minority of cases that
excuse performance when extreme and unforseen difficulties and ex-
pense render performance impracticable."
20 Bruce v. Indianapolis Gas Co., 46 Ind. App. 193, 92 N. E. 189 (1910).
11 International Paper Co. v. Rockefeller, 161, App. Div. 180, 146 X. Y. Supp. 371
(1914).
2 Ontario Deciduous Fruit Grower's Assn. v. Cutting Fruit-Packing Co., 184 Cal.
21, 66 Pac. 28 (1901).
" Snipes Mountain Co. v. Benz Bros. & Co., 162 Wash, 834, 298 Pac. 714 (1931).
24 Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 K. B. 740 (C. A.); See 6 Williston, Contracts 1 1954
(rev. ed. 1938); Buckland, Casus and Frustration in Roman and Common Law, 46
Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1290 (1933).
2 See Comment, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 224 (1947); See Page, Development of the
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 Mich. L. Rev. 589 (1920).
2 See Lr.atatement, Contracts 1 458 (1982); Comment, 43 Mich. L. Rev. 598
(1944); Note, 43 Col. L. Rev. 404 (1948); Note, 18 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 140 (1945).
2 Kiyoichi Fujikawa v. Sunrise Soda Water Works Co., 158 F. 2d 490 (9th.
Cir. 1946); Union Electric Co. v. Lovell Livestock Co., 101 Mont. 450, 54 P. 2d
112 (1936); Hanna v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Accident Ass'n., 204 App. Div.
258, 197 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1922); Newmann v. Goruk, 248 WIs. 508, 11 N. W. 2d
155 (1948).
2" For a collection of cases, see 6 Williston, Contracts § 1968, n. I. (rev. ed. 1938).
See, e. g., Transbay Const. Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 35 P.
Supp. 483 (N. D. Cal. 1940), rev'd on other grounds 184 F. 2d 468 (9th. Cir. 1948);
Mahaska County State Bank v. Brown, 159 Iowa 577, 141 N. W. 459 (1913); cf. Min-
eral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 Pac. 458 (1916).
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The decisions while clearly equitable in some cases seem to be
unrealistic in others. In many highly competitive fields such as road-
building and construction work, costs and estimates are pared to a
minimum in order to achieve low bidder status. To say that an
experienced contractor does not consider the possibility of encoun-
tering conditions that may increase his costs is a refusal to face the
facts. If he does consider it, then the happening is forseeable and loss
should fall on the contractor-promisor. If he considers it and does
not insert an exception into the contract, then the court by "imply-
ing" a condition is in reality creating a new contract for the parties."
Another difficulty in enforcing this minority exception on the basis
of impracticability is the fact that between mere hardship and actual
impossibility lies a vast middleground area for which it will be
difficult if not impossible to set up rules except by a visceral feeling
that justice will be accomplished in a certain case.
DEFIING AND LIMITING FACTORS OF THE ACT OF GOD DoCTRINE
The rigidity of the doctrine of Paradine v. Jane seems unduly
harsh when performance of a contract is rendered impossible by extra-
ordinary manifestations of nature such as lightning, cloudburst, or
flood. State courts have applied the Act of God doctrine even in the
absence of statute as a common law principle." The federal courts
have shown more reluctance in excusing performance due to an
alleged Act of God.'" In delimiting the doctrine, the courts have
said, "..Act of God.. .means an accident against which ordinary skill
and foresight is not expected to provide;"" "... a cause which oper-
ates Without any aid or interference from man; for if the cause of
loss was wholly human or became destructive by human agency and
cooperation, then the loss is to be ascribed to man and not to God...;,,,
"An Act of God is a cause which no human prudence or power could
prevent or avert."' Such things have been characterized as Act of
God: sudden and extraordinary flood," lightning," cloudburst," snow-
storm," tornado,' freeze and frost damage."
"0 See Page, Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18
Mich. L. Rev. 589, 598-99 (1920).
" Id. at 592, n.5 (1920).
. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. White County, 52 F. 2d 1065 (6th. Cir.
1931); United States v. Lewis, 237 Fed. 80 (8th. Cir. 1916); Berg v. Erickson, 284
Fed. 817 (8th. Cir. 1916).
3 Dorman v. Ames, 12 Minn. 347, 362 (1866).
11 Clay County v. Simonsen, 1 Dak. 38, 46 N. W. 592 (1877).
3 Smith v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 91 Ala. 455, 8 So. 754 (1891).
" Strauss v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry., 17 Fed. 209 (1883).
7 Maya v. Missouri & N. A. Ry., 168 Ark. 908, 271 S. W. 977 (1925).
U Rodgers v. Central Pac. Ry., 67 Cal. 607, 8 Pec. 377 (1885).
29 Cormack v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry., 196 N. Y. "442, 90 N. E. 56 (1909).
"0 Chandler v. Aetna Ins. Co., 188 So. 506 (La. App. 1939).
41 Compare Givens v. Vaughn-Griffin Packing Co., 146 Fla. 575, 1 S. 2d 714
(1941), (where frost damage in Florida was termed an Act of God), with Sargent
Barge Line v. The Wyomissing, 127 F. 2d 623 (2nd. Cir. 1942), (where the court
held that ice in the river in New York in January can not be considered an Act of
God). Clearly the latter holding would be compelling precedent should there arise a
North Dakota case involving winter climatic conditions.
29 -
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The expressions "Act of God" and "unavoidable accident" have
sometimes been used synonomously and as equivalent terms, but
there is a distinction. There may be an unavoidable or inevitable
accident which no amount of skill or foresight could prevent; yet
if it is not brought about by some natural or superhuman cause,
it does not fall within the Act of God category. If a ship proceeding
in deep water strikes an object breaking off its propellor and the
ship is damaged, the injury is due to an inevitable accident, but it is
not an Act of God."2 To come within the doctrine the cause of the
inevitable accident must be traceable solely to natural causes not
attributable in any degree to the conduct of man' and not in reason
preventable by human foresight, strength, or care."
Another limitation upon the doctrine is related to the "foresee-
ability rule" of torts. Thus, even though a solely natural cause pre-
Vents performance, if that cause could reasonably have been fore-
seen, the Act of God doctrine is not a good defense to an action
on the contract." The case of Berg v. Erickson' is an apt illustration.
Here the defendant agreed to furnish "plenty of good grass" for
the plaintiff's cattle. A severe drought caused a shortage. The de-
fendant refused to re-deliver the cattle until his agister's lien was
satisfied. Plaintiff replevied the cattle claiming they were worth
$33,000.00 less now than they would have been had the defendant
performed his contract. The defendant pleaded an Act of God as a
defense in that the drought had prevented proper performance. The
court, in finding for the plaintiff, took the view that as droughts
were not uncommon in Kansas, the defendant could have stipulated
in the contract that drought would excuse performance, instead of
making a positive guarantee to furnish plenty of good grass. Was
this lack of a provision due to an oversight or had it been purposely
omitted? The case seems to indicate that the defendant, knowing
conditions in Kansas, made a gamble and lost. It is probable that
the defendant did think of the possibility of drought and intention-
ally left it out of the contract for the purpose of inducing the plain-
tiff to pay him $7.00 per head for pasturing. When a contract is
susceptible to two interpretations, it will usually be construed against
the maker."
The doctrine is further limited in that it does not inure to one who
could have avoided the damage by complying with his contract," nor
41 Alaska Coast Co. v. Alaska Barge Co., 79 Wash. 216, 140 Pac. 334 (1914).
41 Much .. e same test is applied here as in the theory of proximate cause in
negligence actions. See Prosser, Torts §46 (1941).
Hecht v. Boston Wharf Co., 220 Mass. 897, 107 N. E. 990 (1915).
4 Gleeson v. Virginia Midland Ry., 140 U. S. 435 (1891); Ryan v. Rogers, 96
Cal. 349, 81 Pae. 244 (1892).
' 234 Fed. 817 (8th. Cir. 1916).
47 3 Williston, Contracts § 621 (rev. ed. 1938).
48 Holt Mfg. Co. v. Thornton, 186 Cal. 282, 68 Pac. 708 (1902). Plaintiff con-
tracted to harvest grain for the defendant beginning not later than July 5. He did
not start until July 10, and high winds shelled out much of the grain. Held, though
the winds might have been an Act of God, plaintiff could have avoided damage by
complying with his contract.
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does it apply to one who has failed to use due care. The latter stan-
dard is generally applied in negligence actions," but is equally ap-
plicable in contract actions as a defense to the Act of God doctrine.
The Gleeson case' though one involving an action for damages il-
lustrates the same standard which would be applied in contract
cases. Here the plaintiff, a railway mail clerk on defendant's train,
was injured in a derailment caused by a slide in a cut. The defen-
dant pleaded Act of God as a defense because a rain had loosened
the earth, and the vibration of the train caused it to come down.
The defense was denied, since the railroad company had constructed
the cut and was under a duty to maintain it in a reasonably safe
condition. Also the rain was not so unusual as to be termed an
Act of God, and the effect of it on the cut could have been fore-
seen by ordinary engineering skill."
Another limitation upon the. doctrine is that the natural cause
which prevents performance must be one in which no human agency
intervenes." In the Polack case,' a landlord sued his tenant for non-
performance of a covenant to repair damages. The defendant, al-
though admitting that someone had tampered with the reservoir
walls, pleaded Act of God in that unusual rains had filled the
reservoir, causing it to break and flood the property. It was held
that this was not due to an Act of God solely, since unknown third
persons had intervened." The promisor could have provided in his
contract for relief from liability in the event of third party inter-
ference.
Finally even though there is a natural unprecedented catastrophe,
performance will not be excused where the promisor has had
ample warning by newspaper, radio, or otherwise, and has failed
to take adequate precautions. A railroad in North Dakota in late
winter carrying cars of perishables which become stuck in snow-
drifts where the perishables freeze, could hardly plead Act of God
as a defense if snow plows had not been sent out or storm warn-
ings had been ignored.' A promisor would be under some duty to
mitigate the anticipated damage when he has received warning of
the impending natural disturbance.
40 This again is related to the doctrine of proximate cause in negligence actions.
See Prosser, Torts §§ 45-50 (1941).
GO Gleeson v. Virginia Midland Ry., 140 U. S. 435 (1891).
51 Accord, Standard Brands v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, 42 F. Supp. 43 (D. Mass.
1941); Central Georgia Electric Membership Corp. v. Heath, 60 Ga. App. 649, 4
S. E. 2d 700 (1939); Blessing v. Camas Prairie Ry., 3 Wash. 2d 266, 100 P. 2d 416
(1940).
52 Gleeson v. Virginia Midland Ry., 140 U. S. 435 (1891); United States v.
Kansas City Southern Ry., 189 Fed. 471 (D. Ark. 1911) ; Conlin v. Coyne, 19 Cal. App.
2d 78, 64 P. 2d 1123 (1937); Hubbard v. Olsen-Roe Transfer Co., 110 Ore. 618, 224
Pac. 636 (1924); Polack v. Pioche, 35 Cal. 416 (1868).
Polack v. Pioche, 35 Cal. 416 (1868).
Id. at 424.
See Backus v. Start, 13 Fed. 69 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1882), involving inadequate
precautions to avert flood damage.
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APPLICATION OF THE NORTH DAKOTA STATUTE
Perhaps the most common contract that would be affected by
flood conditions such as prevailed in the Spring of 1950 in the Red
River Valley is the ordinary lease of a dwelling or a business es-
tablishment. The Statutes of North Dakota give relief to the lessee
when the property is destroyed." This would not give the relief
desired in many cases where the property was rendered uninhabit-
able for several months, but was later rendered livable when the
flood subsided. Under these conditions could the lessee terminate
the lease without further liability? Could he be relieved from rent
payments during the time the property was uninhabitable? Could the
tenant regard the events as a species of eviction which would re-
lieve him from payments or end the lease? The general rule is that
eviction must be by some positive act of the landlord or third per-
son." Mere uninhabitability does not warrant abandonment of the
premises and is not a constructive eviction.' Thus a flood which
would cause a lessee to vacate the premises would not be a sufficient
eviction to relieve him from the liability of rent payments.
English cases have held that the doctrine of frustration has no
application to ordinary building leases." This is based on the com-
mon law view that a lease of realty is a conveyance of an interest
in land; ' hence a person acquiring a lease is regarded as a purchaser
pro tanto of an estate in land, and he bears the risk of any calamity
that befalls the land since it is regarded as his in equity, subject only
to the right of the lessor to receiverents and profits." English writ-
ers have realized the hardship of the above rule and recommend
some legislative enactment providing relief.62 New York has provided
for positive relief in its statutes ' which in effect excuse perform-
ance upon a showing that the premises have been rendered un-
tenantable by the elements. Apparently the North Dakota Statute"
grants such affirmative relief only when there has been destruction
of the premises. If the majority decisions are followed' no relief
would be granted where there is only partial destruction under
these particular North Dakota statutes. The North Dakota Act of
God statute probably can be used to fill this juridical gap. It should
be noted that where the leased premises are in a region subject
regularly to floods, Act of God would not be a good defense to ex-
56 N. D. Rev. Code If 47-1614, 47-1617 (1943).
57 See, f.." a discussion, 82 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant 1 246 (1941).
" Ibid.
0 Mathey v. Curling, 11922] 2 A. C. 180 (H. L.); Whitehall Court v. Ettlinger,
[1920] 1 K.B. 680 (1918).
60 Tiffany, Real Property § 74 (3rd ed. 1939).
W1 alford, Impossibility and Property Law, 57 L. Q. Rev. 389, 340 (1941).
" Id. at 872.
0 N. Y. Real Property Law §227 (1939).
. N. D. Rev. Code If 47-1614, 47-1617 (1943).
" See, e. g., Waite v. O'Neil, 76 Fed. 408 (6th. Cir. 1896); Humiston, Keeling
and Co. v. Wheeler. 175 Il. 514, 51 N. E. 893 (1898); Ainsworth v. Mount
Moriah Lodge, 172 Blass. 257, 52 N. E. 81 (1898).
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cuse performance. Since the flood is foreseeable, it could be implied
that the parties contracted with that condition in mind.
SUMMARY
No cases in North Dakota have been found directly interpreting
the statute." Hence we must indulge in some intellectual impertin-
ence to forecast what our high court's attitude will be. Since the
statute evidently represents a statement of a common law exception
to the rigid rule of contracts, it is anticipated that a narrow view
will be maintained as to what constitutes an Act of God, so that our
near-sacred concepts of property and contracts will not be greatly
disturbed. The concurring opinion in a North Dakota case" mentions
Act of God, but that doctrine does not seem to have been considered
in the decision. The'court in this case apparently takes the view that
the causes excusing performance as set out in the statute" are not
exclusive, for their reasons seem based on other and perhaps equit-
able grounds.
California with a statute similar to that in North Dakota has
interpreted the Act of God doctrine well within the limitations dis-
cussed in this article. The California courts have also held that the
doctrine is a matter of defense only; it cannot be used to excuse
non-performance by the plaintiff.'
The North Dakota statute lays down certain exceptions to the
hard and fast rule of contract enforcement as illustrated in Paradine
v. Jane. It is not thought that these are the only exceptions to strict
enforcement of a contract. It is believed that inasmuch as they are
exceptions to the strict rule of contracts, they should be narrowly
construed in the interests of the promisee.
LAWYER REFERENCE PLANS-LEGAL AID-LEGAL FACILITIES FOR THE
MODERATE INCOME GROUP. Frequent constitutional assurances may be
found to the effect that every person should be able to find prompt
and certain legal recourse when needed,' a time-honored guarantee
that is expressly set out in the Magna Carta.' That these solemn pro-
visions have not been effective is pointedly indicated in a recent sur-
a N. D. Rev. Code § 9-1104 (1943).
6 Sandry v. Brooklyn School Dist., 47 N. Dak. 444, 182 N. W. 689 (1921).
0 N. D. Rev. Code § 9-1104 (1943).
0 Remy v. Olds, 4 Cal. U. 240, 34 Pac. 216 (1893).
I See Pirsig, Cases on Judicial Administration 1 (1946) for constitutions em-
bodying such guarantees. One group of authorities have indicated that the Federal
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the law requires legal counsel re-
gardless of financial means of client. National Lawyers Guild Committee on Pro-
fessional Problems, The Availability of Legal Services and Judicial Processes to the
Low and Moderate Income Groups and Proposals to Remedy Present Deficiencies, 10
Law. Guild Rev. 8 (1950).
3 Magna Charta 1 40 (1215).
